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MODELS OF REGULATION
James V. DeLong*

Edited by James Q. Wilson.
New York: Basic Books. 1980. Pp. xii, 468. $18.95.
THE POLITICS OF

REGULATION.

In some ways, The Politics ofRegulation is a bit shapeless. It has
chapters by nine separate authors on nine different regulatory programs loosely grouped into three categories: "Traditional Regulation: Rates and Entry''; "Regulation of Competitive Practices"; and
"The 'New' Regulation: Products and Processes." 1 While an introduction and tenth chapter on "The Politics of Regulation" by the
editor, the eminent Harvard political scientist James Q. Wilson, provide some useful synthesis and interpretation, the overall approach
remains diffuse. The editor himself acknowledges that the "agencies
covered . . . [were] selected by no particular plan" (p. xi). The individual segments are uniformly well-written, easy to read, and even
- for a connoisseur of the administrative process - entertaining,
but one is often uncertain why a particular issue receives so much
attention and another none at all, or how an individual chapter fits
into any framework for the book as a whole. Nor is this an "important" work in the sense that it presents startling new data or original
hypotheses about regulation. Professor Wilson's themes derive from
prior political science work (including his own, of course), and the
individual chapters are too unsystematic and idiosyncratic to be totally convincing unless one is predisposed to be convinced.
Nonetheless, The Politics of Regulation deserves a thoughtful
reading by any lawyer involved in the regulatory process, whether as
regulator, practitioner, academician, or judge, because its analysis
* Member of the District of Columbia Bar. A.B. 1960, Harvard College; J.D. 1963,
Harvard Law School. This Review was written while the author was Research Director of the
Administrative Conference of the United States, and the author wishes to thank the Conference for its support. The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author. - Ed.
1. The specific programs covered are Traditional Regulation: Rates and Entry (which includes chapters on State Regulation of Electric Utilities, The Federal Maritime Commission,
and The Civil Aeronautics Board), Regulation of Competitive Practices (which includes chapters on The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and The Federal Trade Commission), and The ''New'' Regulation: Products and Processes (which includes chapters on The
Food and Drug Administration, The Occupational Safety and Health Administration, The
Environmental Protection Agency, and The Office for Civil Rights).
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leads inexorably to some serious and long overdue questions about
the state of contemporary administrative law.
To explain why this is so requires some setting of the stage.

I
The term "model" tends to create an image of an elaborately
programmed computer spitting printouts, and, of course, a mathematical model relying on computer capability is one example of the
genre. Actually, the word has a far broader meaning. A model is "a
simplified representation of some aspect of the real world, . . . the
purposeful reduction of a mass of information to a manageable size
and shape."2 An organization chart is a model of an institution and
a work-flow chart a model of its internal processes. So, too, a model
can be a verbal description of how an organization, including a federal agency, functions; any description contains, explicitly or implicitly, a whole series of simplifying assumptions about the purposes of
the organization and its members, and about their interactions with
each other and the outside world. A model highlights the important
features of a situation or class of situations and eliminates the irrelevancies and details. It is a truism that everyone thinks in terms
of models, whether they know it or not, and that how well a model
reflects the relevant dimensions of the real world is a crucial determinant of its utility for any analysis of real problems.
Much of administrative law is based on a particular model of the
administrative process handed down from the Progressive Era and
the New Deal. In this model, agencies function as neutral professional administrators that apply some complicated and almost mystical expertise to promote congressionally mandated goals. 3 As
Professor Richard Stewart has observed, the model is based on the
presumption that an administrator enjoys little real discretion because "[t]he policy to be set is simply a function of the goal to be
achieved and the state of the world, ... [and] persons subject to the
administrator's control are no more liable to his arbitrary will than
are patients remitted to the care of a skilled doctor."4 Even when it
is conceded that the administrator has more free will than allowed
by this characterization, the dominant image is still one of a neutral
expert working toward an undefinable but presumptively attainable
goal of "the public interest."
2. E.

STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 8 (1978).
3. See Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667,

1671-88 (1975) (collecting sources).
4. Id. at 1678.
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From this model flow several doctrinal consequences, including
the presumption of agency expertise, the importance of deference to
agency decisions, the virtual unreviewability of an agency's policy
choices, the idea that the decision-making process within an agency
should remain a closed box and the mind of the collective administrator unprobed, the assumption that an agency can be relied upon
to make disinterested judgments about how best to build a record,
and the inapplicability of such litigation-based concepts as ex parte
communications, bias, and prejudgment.
The problem with the model is that no respectable thinker
outside the legal profession, and few within - including the judges
who use it every day - think that it adequately approximates reality. Since its heyday in the 1930s, it has been undermined by "the
complexities of a managed economy in a welfare state, and . . . the
corrosive seduction of welfare economics and pluralist political analysis . . . ." 5 This inadequacy has become manifest even in the
traditional areas of regulation where an agency exercises broad discretion over a closely bounded area of the economy, such as railroads and trucks, airlines, or telecommunications. In the areas that
have been subjected to explosive regulatory growth over the past
fifteen years - the environment, safety and health, and consumer
protection - this inadequacy increasingly slides over into absurdity. 6 Today, various agencies exercise tremendous power over millions of individual decisions in all sections of the economy, and no
sensible person believes that this power is exercised in a spirit of
neutral, disinterested technical expertise.7
In place of the model of the agency as Platonic Guardian there is
now a varied collection of half-competitive, half-complementary
models. Observers of the administrative process now speak of agencies captured by industry and agencies captured by clientele groups;
of "iron triangles," each composed of an agency, an interest group,
and a congressional committee; of bureaucrats who maximize budgets (or power, or future income, or security) and Congressmen who
maximize votes; of the economics of collective action and the theory
of political coalitions; of agencies as stakeholders for competing special interests; of market failures and their mirror image, the
5. Id. at 1683.
6. See, e.g., DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration ofLaw and Policy, 65 VA. L.
REv. 257, 276-78 (1979).
7. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN & W. HAsSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981) (the book is
subtitled, "How the Clean Air Act Became a Multibillion-Dollar Bail-Out for High-Sulfur
Coal Producers and What Should Be Done About It").

888

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 80:885

systematic failures of non.market mechanisms; of organizational incentive structures; of the bureaucratic territorial imperative; and,
finally, probably of other concepts that have not crossed this reviewer's desk. 8 No one knows what model (or, more likely, what
collection of models) of administrative action should replace the
traditional one, but there is universal agreement that the old one is
inoperative.
The erosion of the intellectual base of New Deal-style administrative law does not necessarily mean that the original "doctrinal
consequences" no longer apply. Even if one believes that much
agency expertise is a legal fiction, one can still take the view that a
marginally expert agency that has studied a problem should not be
overruled by an even less expert court. One can be concerned about
capture of an agency by the interests that it is supposed to regulate
and still regard the requirement of an adequate articulation of the
basis for decision as a sufficient check. One can think that agency
decision-making needs scrutiny and reform without wanting to open
all of an agency's confidential files to discovery requests by the janissaries of the Washington bar. Most fundamentally, one can be certain that federal agencies' policy decisions need more rigorous
oversight, review, and coordination without concluding that a court
of appeals is the proper body to exercise this function. 9 Thus, there
are some excellent reasons, aside from the natural inertia of any system built on precedent, for being reluctant to abandon traditional
principles.
But if the presumptions supporting New Deal-style administrative law are not necessarily wrong, they are not necessarily right either, and at the very least the answers no longer come automatically.
Browsing through the administrative law cases of the past ten years
gives one a sense of the tension created by the dissonance between
the conventional wisdom of the classic model and the courts' own
8. For an excellent synopsis of the development of these theories, see Schuck, Book Review, 90 YALE LJ. 702 (1981) (reviewing The Politics of Regulation). Another interesting
work, and a rich bibliographical source, is P. Aranson, The Uncertain Search for Regulatory
Reform (1978) (Working Paper No. 79-3, Law and Economics Center, University of Miami
School of Law).
9. The judges seem to agree. On July 20, 1981, the Judicial Conference sent a letter to the
Congress expressing concern about the degree to which pending regulatory reform legislation
would increase the authority and responsibility of the courts with regard to Federal Regulation. See Legal Times of Washington, July 27, 1981, at 20, col. 1. In an interesting innovation,
California has created an Office of Administrative Law within the Governor's Office to review
agency regulations and reject those that are unnecessary, unauthorized, incomprehensible, or
inconsistent with other extant laws. See M. PRICE, EXECUTIVE CONTROL OF RULEMAKINO:
THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN CALIFORNIA (1981) (Available from the Administrative Conference of the United States, Washington, D.C.)
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appraisals of governmental realities. 10 Indeed, this reviewer has argued elsewhere that the hybrid rule-making doctrines developed in
the 1970s were a creative effort to resolve this tension. 11 The dissonance also creates many problems for the bar. While these are less
easy to document, in talking to Washington lawyers one is struck by
the distinction between the realities of dealing with agencies and
counselling clients, and the formal requirements of administrative
law as a self-contained; logical system. 12
Nor has the academic legal community been happy with the situation. Scholars accepted the hybrid rule-making cases surprisingly
quickly, 13 most probably because they would have welcomed almost
any effort to bring legal doctrine more into line with perceived
reality.
Although Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources .Defense Council, Inc. 14 has placed in doubt the continuing
validity of the hybrid rule-making cases, the underlying pressure for
change still exists, and is finding a number of outlets. During the
past fifteen years, Congress has enacted many statutes requiring particular procedures and processes in rule-making; 15 three successive
Presidents have promulgated reform-minded Executive Orders; 16
and more ge.neral regulatory reform legislation seems imminent. It
is clear that legal change has come and will continue, but its exact
direction and the implicit or explicit models of regulation on which it
will be based remain uncertain.

II
It is this context of tension and change that should make the Politics ofRegulation interesting to the legal profession, particularly because the authors are concerned more with description than
10. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane) (various opinions setting
forth contrasting views about the EPA), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
11. See DeLong, supra note 6,passim.
12. For one practicing lawyer's candid views of an agency with which he was embroiled,
see R. Wald, After the Hearing is Over (Speech for the Practicing Law Institute's Conference
on FfC Rulemaking Procedures and Practice, Washington, D.C., Mar. 8, 1977).
13. See Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the .D.C Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978
SUP. CT. REV. 345.
14. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). For contrasting views on the impact of this case, compare Scalia,
supra note 13, with DeLong, supra note 6, at 309-19.
15. See, DeLong, supra note 6, at 275-76 (collecting sources).
16. President Reagan: Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981); President
Carter: Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978); President Ford: Exec. Order No.
11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (1974).
·
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abstraction, and with effective communication rather than academic
jargon. In Professor Wilson's words:
[T]he authors conferred on the scope, organization, and style of the
essays to ensure that they would address some common issues: how
the agency was created and its fundamental legislation passed; what
the agency normally does (how it defines its task); what major controversies have erupted over its rule-making or rule-enforcing procedures;
and how one might best explain the agencies' preference for one course
of action rather than another. All these agencies exercise discretionary
authority, some under statutes so vague as to provide little more than a
general hunting license. The authors are interested in competing theories about why an agency uses its discretion in one way rather than
another. [P. xii.]

Thus, the book is about politics in the broad sense - the interaction
of ideas, interests, and expectations in the society at large, in Congress, and in the agencies that determine "how goals [are] determined, conflict resolved or managed, standards set, and policy
enforced" (p. xi).
Since, as the title implies, the book is an analytic survey of "the
politics of regulation," rather than a narrowly designed monograph
with a specific thesis, neither the book as a whole nor Professor Wilson's final essay reaches any overarching conclusions. Wilson finds
conventional capture theory - the view that regulatory outcomes
are determined by the interests of the regulated - much too simplistic, and the thought that this would probably tum out to be the case
seems to have been a primary motive for writing the book (pp. 35763). But Wilson does not attempt to replace capture theory with an
explanation of his own because, as he notes in the conclusion, "[a]
single-explanation theory of regulatory politics is about as helpful as
a single explanation of politics generally, or of disease" (p. 393).
Nonetheless, because Wilson does identify a number of recurring
problems, as well as new ways of analyzing them, the book is filled
with intriguing insights into the realities of the administrative
process.
Some of his insights remain fairly abstract. Professor Wilson's
"most distinctive contribution to regulatory theory," 17 according to
one scholar, is his emphasis on the kinds of regulatory politics that
arise under different distributions of costs and benefits in a particular
sector of the economy. When both costs and benefits are widely distributed among the populace, a different regulatory structure is produced than when they are narrowly concentrated in identifiable
groups. Still other structures are produced when costs are widely
17. Schuck, supra note 8, at 717.
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distributed and benefits concentrated, or costs concentrated and benefits diffused. Wilson labels the types of interactions resulting from
these four situations as, respectively: (I) Majoritarian politics;
(2) Interest group politics; (3) Client politics; and (4) Entrepreneurial
politics (pp. 366-69). 18
The book also discusses a number of more immediately practical
issues, though many are touched on only briefly. For example, a
recurring theme is the importance of the norms and standards of various professions - law (pp. 46, 173-78), economics (pp. 166-73),
health and safety consulting (pp. 250-51 ), engineering (p. 36), and so
on - in determining how an agency actually carries out its tasks.
The idea of capture, whether by industry or by client groups, naturally receives attention, again with emphasis on the specific context
under discussion (pp. 62-68, 328-38). The book also seeks to explain
at least some regulatory politics in terms of the considerations that
originally led to the creation of a given agency or program. An
agency's early history, the authors find, can often affect its development years later (pp. 79-90).
An agency's development can be further influenced by the attitudes of its staff members - whether they identify their careers and
rewards with the agency, hope to use it as a springboard to better
things, or regard other members of a professional group as their significant reference point (pp. 372-82). Federal officials, moreover, are
often primarily concerned with avoiding catastrophe, and the operational definition of "catastrophe" can profoundly affect an agency's
decisions. 19 Almost as important as avoiding catastrophe is avoiding
ridicule, since doing something silly or something that lends itself to
easy caricature can make opponents out of people who normally
have little interest in the agency's activities (pp. 375-76). 20 Professor
Wilson notes that fear of catastrophe or ridicule often produces rules
dealing with even the remotest contingencies. He comments:
Critics of regulatory agencies notice this proliferation of rules and sup18. Professor Schuck raises a crucial question about this typology: What about the common situation where no one knows how the costs and benefits are going to be distributed? Id.
at 718-19.
19. For example, to an FDA official a drug catastrophe is thalidomide babies, or approval
of something that turns out to have carcinogenic effect, however slight, rather than the deaths
of patients who might (or might not) have been saved by a drug that has not yet been approved
by the FDA. To the CAB or the FMC the catastrophe to be feared has been the bankruptcy of
a major carrier, not the consumer loss caused by lack of competition and inflated rates. Pp.
375-76.
20. OSHA got into more trouble for requiring split toilet seats and for publishing a booklet
warning farmers about the dangers of slipping on manure than for any of its more important
actions. The EPA would not seriously consider imposing effluent charges for fear of the tag
that it was "selling licenses to pollute." Pp. 376-77.
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pose that it is the result of the "imperialistic" or expansionist instincts
of bureaucratic organizations. Though there are such examples, I am
struck more by the defensive, threat-avoiding, scandal minimizing instincts of these agencies. [Pp. 377-78.)

An agency can appear most power hungry, in other words, precisely
when it is acting most defensively.
Bureaucratic politics, finally, can provide only an incomplete explanation for much of what agencies do. The Politics of Regulation
consistently emphasizes the importance of ideas in regulatory policymaking (pp. 393-94). However influential the interplay of material
interests, it takes place in a context of attitudes and ideas that have
an important role in determining the nature of the ultimate decisions. ''To the extent an agency can choose, its choices will be importantly shaped by what its executives learned in college a decade
or two earlier'' (p. 393).
Professor Wilson could have added that this makes the effort to
understand the politics of the regulatory process one that by definition can never be completed. The very existence of any model that
achieves intellectual currency will itself affect the process in ways
that will in tum require the construction of new models, which will
affect the process, and so on. No one could deny, for example, that
the development and acceptance of capture theory has itself had a
tremendous impact on the regulatory politics of the 1960s and
1970s.21 It seems almost inevitable that some of the newer theories,
such as those based on bureaucratic self-interest or on Professor Wilson's four-cell matrix, will similarly affect regulatory politics in the
future.

III
For the administrative lawyer, the question remains: What do I
get out of the book besides a Sunday's entertainment and a few war
stories? Does it change my behavior on Monday morning? The answer is that it probably should. At least it should change the way
that the lawyer thinks about the administrative process on Monday
morning, and this is likely to change his behavior on Tuesday, because thinking in terms of the broad political and bureaucratic considerations discussed in the book creates new insights into legal
problems.
This point is best argued by illustration, and a good vehicle is the
1979 case, Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC. 22 In
21. See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 8, at 706-07.
22. 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 921 (1980).
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1978, the FTC started a rule-making proceeding looking toward restrictions on television advertising directed at children. Before the
proceeding had begun, Chairman Michael Pertschuk had made
speeches and written letters strongly indicating that he believed such
advertising was indeed unfair under the vague standards of section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 23 One could reasonably draw
the conclusion from his statements that he regarded the impending
proceeding as a device to provide the formal underpinnings for this
conclusion, not as an open inquiry into the desirability of his policy
choice.
The advertisers sued to disqualify Pertschuk on the grounds of
bias and prejudgment. They used two basic arguments. First, Congress has mandated {hat FTC rule-making proceedings incorporate
such special devices as oral hearings, opportunities for cross-examination and rebuttal, and detailed statements of basis and purpose.
This, the advertisers said, made the proceedings "adjudicative" or
"quasi-adjudicative," and thus subject to the normal standards applicable in ariy judicial proceeding. These standards would rather
clearly proscribe the statements made. And second, even if a looser
standard were applied, the Chairman had shown sufficient bias to be
disqualified. 24
The advertisers lost. Concerning the first argument, the court
noted that FTC rule-making was designed to produce a legislative
judgment about wise policy, and that the mere engrafting of some
quasi-judicial procedural limitations on the FTC's powers in no way
affected the essentially legislative character of the agency's mandate.
Concerning the second, the court emphasized that policy-making administrators cannot act like neutral adjudicators; they must debate
issues, muster political support, and shape the agency's agenda.
Before proposing a rule, the Commissioners must necessarily reach
some tentative conclusions, even if they change their minds after the
full hearing. A Commissioner should be disqualified, the court concluded, only upon a "clear and convincing showing that [he] has an
unalterably closed mind on matters critical to the disposition of the
proceeding."25 Pertschuk.'s statements were not strong enough to fall
under the rule.
Thus far, the decision seems unexceptionable. The argument
that rule-making is not really rule-making is extremely tenuous; the
23. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l) (1976).
24. 627 F.2d at 1158.
25. 627 F.2d at 1170.
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attempt to impose constitutional due process requirements on rulemaking has been rejected by the Supreme Court; 26 and the contention that an FTC Chairman should have no opinions on the applicability of the statute that he is required to enforce is far-fetched.
Nonetheless, if one thinks in Professor Wilson's terms, one sees
another, more respectable, dimension to the advertisers' case. The
plaintiffs focused only on Pertschuk's responsibility to vote on any
final rule and on whether his statements indicated that he could not
carry out this function fairly. Viewed this way, the court seems
clearly right; the fact that a Chairman thinks the evidence in a fullscale proceeding will come out in a particular way is not an adequate
ground to assume that he will refuse to listen to arguments that it has
come out differently. But Pertschuk has another bureaucratic role in
addition to that of decision-maker. He is the hierarchical chief of a
large staff whose future promotions and career prospects depend on
his good will. One of the most iron laws of bureaucratic survival is
that one does not leave one's boss hanging out to dry in an unsupportable position, or get into a situation where the newspapers will
write, "FTC staff says its Chairman shot his mouth off without
knowing what he was talking about." Even if the Chairman could
have heard contradictory evidence with an open mind, simply by
committing himself publicly to a position from which it would be
embarrassing to retreat he ensured that his staff had strong disincentives to develop any such contradictory evidence. Since in the FTC
system most information is filtered through the staff,27 it was thus
unlikely that he - or any of the other Commi~ioners, for that matter - would ever be exposed to it at all. According to this analysis,
the real problem in determining the proper standard of disqualification concerned the impact on the organization, not on the Chairman
himself.
That this argument would have won for the advertisers is doubtful; it is a little too unfamiliar. But it is a better argument than any
they had, and, more importantly from the standpoint of their longterm strategic interests, the need to answer it might have caused the
FTC to examine, and possibly change, its own internal incentive
structures.
Another illustration from a totally different context provides an
26. Most recently in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
27. See generally B. Boyer, Trade Regulation Rulemaking Procedures of the Federal
Trade Commission (May 1979 & June 1980) (A Report to the Administrative Conference of
the United States, Washington, D.C.).
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interesting contrast. In the current debates over regulatory reform
legislation, some private groups seem convinced that procedural
changes will solve their problems, that adding cross-examination or
requirements for more elaborate written justification will change the
way that agencies approach their regulatory tasks. In some cases this
hope seems ephemeral because it represents an effort to find procedural solutions to substantive problems. If an agency is forbidden to
consider costs, for example, no amount of cross-examination is going
to improve its cost-benefit analysis. Equally serious, though, is that
it also represents an effort to find procedural solutions to political
problems. If an agency thinks that it should redistribute wealth to
the clientele group from which it derives its political support, requiring it to jump through some extra procedural hoops may slow it
down a little, at least until it learns the game, but is unlikely to have
any very permanent impact. The real question, according to the
kind of analysis undertaken in The Politics of Regulation, may be
how to shift the internal incentive structures or the external political
context to change the nature of the pressures on agency personnel.
One could find a number of other examples from other cases and
contexts, but these two are sufficient to make the basic point: The
explicit use of some of the models of agency behavior that are being
developed by the political scientists, economists, and organization
theorists can provide some new insights into legal problems. This is
enough to justify saying that The Politics ofRegulation is not only an
interesting book but a useful one as well.

